What Exactly is the Explanatory Gap?

Philosophia 39 (1):5-19 (2011)
It is widely agreed among contemporary philosophers of mind that science leaves us with an ‘explanatory gap’—that even after we know everything that science can tell us about the conscious mind and the brain, their relationship still remains mysterious. I argue that this agreed view is quite mistaken. The feeling of a ‘explanatory gap’ arises only because we cannot stop ourselves thinking about the mind–brain relation in a dualist way
Keywords Explanatory gap  Dualist intuition  Phenomenal concepts  Reductive explanatory  Mind-brain identity
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DOI 10.1007/s11406-010-9273-6
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References found in this work BETA
Saul Kripke (2010). Naming and Necessity. In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 431-433.

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