Episteme 5 (2):pp. 239-250 (2008)

MacKinnon has famously claimed that there is a connection between objectivity and objectification. This paper examines this connection by focusing on a particular norm of objectivity, Assumed Objectivity, which is linked to women's objectification. Haslanger argues that this norm should be rejected since, under conditions of gender inequality, (a) it harms the interests of women (it is pragmatically bad), and (b) it yields false beliefs (it is epistemically bad). Langton attempts to go beyond Haslanger's critique, suggesting that this norm is also epistemically bad because it yields true but unjustified beliefs (beliefs that have a wrong direction of fit). I argue that while the norm of Assumed Objectivity is epistemically problematic in yielding false beliefs, it is wrongly accused of yielding true but unjustified beliefs
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DOI 10.3366/E1742360008000348
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Beyond a Pragmatic Critique of Reason.Rae Langton - 1993 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (4):364 – 384.

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