Infallibility Naturalized: Reply to Hoffmann

Dialectica 67 (3):353-358 (2013)
Authors
T. Parent
Virginia Tech
Abstract
The present piece is a reply to G. Hoffmann on my infallibilist view of self-knowledge. Contra Hoffmann, it is argued that the view does not preclude a Quinean epistemology, wherein every belief is subject to empirical revision
Keywords Quine  Infallibilism and Fallibilism  A Priori Knowledge  Self-Knowledge  Burge  Compositionality  Belief Revision and Revisability
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DOI 10.1111/1746-8361.12025
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References found in this work BETA

Elusive Knowledge.David Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.
Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Willard V. O. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Empirical Case Against Infallibilism.T. Parent - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (1):223-242.

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