Dialectica 67 (3):353-358 (2013)
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| Abstract |
The present piece is a reply to G. Hoffmann on my infallibilist view of self-knowledge. Contra Hoffmann, it is argued that the view does not preclude a Quinean epistemology, wherein every belief is subject to empirical revision
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| Keywords | Quine Infallibilism and Fallibilism A Priori Knowledge Self-Knowledge Burge Compositionality Belief Revision and Revisability |
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| Reprint years | 2013 |
| DOI | 10.1111/1746-8361.12025 |
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References found in this work BETA
On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.
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Citations of this work BETA
The Empirical Case Against Infallibilism.T. Parent - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (1):223-242.
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