Belief and pathology of self-awareness: A phenomenological contribution to the classification of delusions
Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (10-11):148-161 (2004)
Delusions are usually defined as false beliefs about the state of affairs in the public world. Taking this premise as unquestionable, the debate in cognitive science tends to oscillate between the so-called 'rationalist approach'- proposing some breakdown in the central intellective modules embodying human rationality - and the 'empiricist approach' - proposing a primary peripheral deficit , followed by explanatory efforts in the form of delusions. In this article the foundational assumption about delusion is questioned. Especially in the case of schizophrenia, delusions are not epistemic statements about external world but metaphorical reports of altered structure of experiencing . Delusions as epistemic statements or beliefs occur paradigmatically in delusional disorder . These two types of delusions are compared from a primarily phenomenological stance
|Keywords||Belief Delusion Metaphysics Pathology Self-awareness|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
When Words Speak Louder Than Actions: Delusion, Belief, and the Power of Assertion.David Rose, Wesley Buckwalter & John Turri - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy (4):1-18.
Mysticism and Schizophrenia: A Phenomenological Exploration of the Structure of Consciousness in the Schizophrenia Spectrum Disorders.Josef Parnas & Mads Gram Henriksen - 2016 - Consciousness and Cognition 43:75-88.
Similar books and articles
Monothematic Delusions: Towards a Two-Factor Account.Martin Davies, Max Coltheart, Robyn Langdon & N. Breen - 2001 - Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology 8 (2-3):133-58.
In Defence of the Doxastic Conception of Delusions.Timothy J. Bayne & Elisabeth Pacherie - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (2):163-88.
Imagination, Delusion, and Self-Deception.Andy Egan - 2008 - In Tim Bayne & Jordi Fernandez (eds.), Delusion and Self-Deception: Affective and Motivational Influences on Belief Formation (Macquarie Monographs in Cognitive Science). Psychology Press.
Bottom-Up or Top-Down: Campbell's Rationalist Account of Monothematic Delusions.Tim Bayne & Elisabeth Pacherie - 2004 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (1):1-11.
Phenomenology and Delusions: Who Put the 'Alien' in Alien Control?Elisabeth Pacherie, Melissa Green & Timothy J. Bayne - 2006 - Consciousness and Cognition 15 (3):566-577.
Awareness and Knowing: Implications for Rehabilitation.Peter W. Halligan - 2006 - Neuropsychological Rehabilitation 16 (4):456-473.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads85 ( #62,150 of 2,177,981 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #317,027 of 2,177,981 )
How can I increase my downloads?