Bradley’s Paradox and Russell’s Theory of Relations

Philosophy Research Archives 10:261-273 (1984)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

A coherent theory of relations was a critical part of Russell’s metaphysics. In Appearance and Reality Bradley posed a problem that sits squarely in the way of any doctrine of “external” relations. Russell, determined to advance such a doctrine, tried several times to find a way around the paradox and apparently believed he had succeeded by making use of one of his inventions, the theory of logical types.Gilbert Ryle and Alan Donagan have advanced an argument that I read, over the objections of its authors, as a special case of Bradley’s. In this paper I argue that the ad hoc solution suggested by Donagan to the special problem is one that Russell had already indicated a willingness to accept but that the general problem of the paradox remains.What finally prevents Russell from solving the paradox is a combination of his refusal to abandon the claim that relations are constituents of facts and the necessity of distinguishing a relational fact from its converse. Following some hints that Russell left, I do some reconstruction, showing how the theory of types would have been applied had Russell followed through on his own insights. The result, I suggest, is a truly Russellian theory that escapes Bradley’s paradox.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 74,480

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Bradley’s Paradox and Russell’s Theory of Relations.Richard Parker - 1984 - Philosophy Research Archives 10:261-273.
Russell's Way Out of the Paradox of Propositions.André Fuhrmann - 2002 - History and Philosophy of Logic 23 (3):197-213.
On Russell's Vulnerability to Russell's Paradox.James Levine - 2001 - History and Philosophy of Logic 22 (4):207-231.
Russell´s Early Type Theory and the Paradox of Propositions.André Fuhrmann - 2001 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 5 (1-2):19-41.
Zermelo and Russell's Paradox: Is There a Universal Set?G. Landini - 2013 - Philosophia Mathematica 21 (2):180-199.
Relations, Again: A Reply to Gull.M. S. Gram - 1971 - New Scholasticism 45 (4):611-618.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-02-15

Downloads
4 (#1,230,205)

6 months
1 (#417,896)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references