Computer simulation through an error-statistical lens

Synthese 163 (3):371-384 (2008)

Authors
Wendy Parker
Durham University
Abstract
After showing how Deborah Mayo’s error-statistical philosophy of science might be applied to address important questions about the evidential status of computer simulation results, I argue that an error-statistical perspective offers an interesting new way of thinking about computer simulation models and has the potential to significantly improve the practice of simulation model evaluation. Though intended primarily as a contribution to the epistemology of simulation, the analysis also serves to fill in details of Mayo’s epistemology of experiment.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy of Language   Metaphysics   Epistemology   Logic
Categories No categories specified
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-007-9296-0
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References found in this work BETA

Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge.Deborah Mayo - 1996 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 15 (1):455-459.
Sanctioning Models: The Epistemology of Simulation.Eric Winsberg - 1999 - Science in Context 12 (2):275-292.

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Citations of this work BETA

II—Wendy S. Parker: Confirmation and Adequacy-for-Purpose in Climate Modelling.Wendy S. Parker - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):233-249.
Varieties of Support and Confirmation of Climate Models.Elisabeth A. Lloyd - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):213-232.
Computer Simulation and the Philosophy of Science.Eric Winsberg - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (5):835-845.

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