Dissertation, University of Delhi (2018)
AbstractIn my research, I will try to study the notion of epistemic injustice by focusing on Miranda Fricker’s work in the area of epistemic injustice. Miranda Fricker talks about two forms of epistemic injustice which, she believes, are distinctively epistemic in nature. These two forms of epistemic injustice are testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice which help us to understand the epistemic injustice faced by an individual or a social group. So we can say that these two categories provide us with the theoretical tools to formulate and theorize about distinct kinds of epistemic injustice, which can’t be easily formulated in Goldman’s VSE model1 and other models of social epistemology.
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References found in this work
Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing.Miranda Fricker - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
A Social History of Truth: Civility and Science in Seventeenth-Century England.Steven Shapin - 1994 - University of Chicago Press.