Content Externalism and Equivocal Inference


Authors
T. Parent
Nazarbayev University
Abstract
This draft now appears (in revised form) as Chapter 6 of _Self-Reflection for the Opaque Mind_. See http://philpapers.org/rec/PARSFT-3.
Keywords anti-individualism  the rationality of reflection  implicit or non-occurrent belief  Burge, Tyler  Boghossian, Paul  Brown, Jessica
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