Haecceitas and the Bare Particular

Review of Metaphysics 44 (2):375 - 397 (1990)

Authors
Woosuk Park
Korea Advanced Institute of Science & Technology (KAIST)
Abstract
ACCORDING TO DUNS SCOTUS, what makes a material substance an individual is a positive entity which falls within the category of substance and contracts the specific nature to this or that. That entity, called haecceitas, together with the formal distinction, constitutes the core of Scotus' theory of individuation. But what is haecceitas? Haecceitas is not definable. Nor can we be acquainted with it. Then how could we understand it? Both negatively and positively, Scotus himself tried to give an answer to this question. Before presenting his haecceitas theory, Scotus criticized six different types of rival theories available in his day: the position of the nominalists, the double negation theory, the theory of individuation by actual existence, the theory of individuation by quantity or other accidents, the theory of individuation by matter, and the theory attributed to Godfrey of Fontaines. In other words, he was explaining "what haecceitas is not" when he criticized these theories. More importantly, he tried to give us a positive characterization of haecceitas. Since he used "individual difference" as a synonym for "haecceitas," he resorted to an analogy between the specific difference and the individual difference in order to explain the notion of haecceitas. The problem is that twentieth-century ontologists may not be patient enough to study the triple analogy, which again presupposes Scotus' doctrines of the formal distinction and the ultimate difference. In order to draw their attention to Scotus' theory of individuation, one would need to discuss the following questions: How can we translate the term "haecceitas" into modern terminology? Is there any counterpart of haecceitas in contemporary ontology? For what reasons should we reintroduce haecceitas into the current discussion of individuation, if it has a good counterpart? Is there still anything significant left to add to our understanding of haecceitas?
Keywords Catholic Tradition  Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 0034-6632
DOI revmetaph1990442106
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 46,425
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Thisness and Visual Objects.Błażej Skrzypulec - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (1):17-32.
What If Haecceity is Not a Property?Woosuk Park - 2016 - Foundations of Science 21 (3):511-526.
Individuação.Rodrigo Guerizoli - 2014 - Compêndio Em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Common Nature and Haecceitas.Woosuk Park - 1989 - Franziskanische Studien 71:188-192.
Are Bare Particulars Constituents?Richard Brian Davis - 2013 - Acta Analytica 28 (4):395-410.
Bare Particulars and Individuation Reply to Mertz.J. P. Moreland & Timothy Pickavance - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):1 – 13.
The Bare Metaphysical Possibility of Bare Dispositions.Jennifer McKitrick - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):349–369.
The Price of Insisting That Quantum Mechanics is Complete.P. D. Magnus - 2004 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (2):257-267.
No Bare Particulars.Andrew M. Bailey - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (1):31-41.
A Unified Analysis of the English Bare Plural.Greg N. Carlson - 1977 - Linguistics and Philosophy 1 (3):413 - 456.
'Partially Clad' Bare Particulars Exposed.Richard Brian Davis - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):534 – 548.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2011-05-29

Total views
46 ( #193,645 of 2,286,306 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #848,598 of 2,286,306 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature