In the Mental Fiction, Mental Fictionalism is Fictitious

The Monist 96 (4):605-621 (2013)
Here I explore the prospects for fictionalism about the mental, modeled after fictionalism about possible worlds. Mental fictionalism holds that the mental states posited by folk psychology do not exist, yet that some sentences of folk psychological discourse are true. This is accomplished by construing truths of folk psychology as “truths according to the mentalistic fiction.” After formulating the view, I identify five ways that the view appears self-refuting. Moreover, I argue that this cannot be fixed by semantic ascent or by a kind of primitivism. Even so, I also show that the “self-refutation” charges are subtly question-begging. Nevertheless, the reply reveals that a mental fictionalist ought to be a kind of quietist.
Keywords Pretense Theory  Eliminativism  Primitive Terms  Semantic Ascent  Quietism
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2014
DOI 10.5840/monist201396428
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 24,411
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
T. Parent (2016). The Empirical Case Against Infallibilism. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (1):223-242.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

123 ( #36,072 of 1,924,713 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

35 ( #11,190 of 1,924,713 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.