In the Mental Fiction, Mental Fictionalism is Fictitious

The Monist 96 (4):605-621 (2013)
Authors
T. Parent
Virginia Tech
Abstract
Here I explore the prospects for fictionalism about the mental, modeled after fictionalism about possible worlds. Mental fictionalism holds that the mental states posited by folk psychology do not exist, yet that some sentences of folk psychological discourse are true. This is accomplished by construing truths of folk psychology as “truths according to the mentalistic fiction.” After formulating the view, I identify five ways that the view appears self-refuting. Moreover, I argue that this cannot be fixed by semantic ascent or by a kind of primitivism. Even so, I also show that the “self-refutation” charges are subtly question-begging. Nevertheless, the reply reveals that a mental fictionalist ought to be a kind of quietist.
Keywords Pretense Theory  Eliminativism  Primitive Terms  Semantic Ascent  Quietism
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2014
DOI 10.5840/monist201396428
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 34,484
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

The Empirical Case Against Infallibilism.T. Parent - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (1):223-242.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Unnaturalness of the Mental: The Status of Folk Psychology.Mark Leon - 1998 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 36 (3):367-92.
Hermeneutic Fictionalism.Jason Stanley - 2001 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 25 (1):36–71.
Folk Psychology and Phenomenal Consciousness.Justin Sytsma - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (8):700-711.
Attitudes Without Propositions.Mark Balaguer - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):805-26.
Acting and Perceiving in Body and Mind.Natika Newton - 1985 - Philosophy Research Archives 11:407-429.
Why Modal Fictionalism is Not Self-Defeating.Richard Woodward - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (2):273 - 288.
Fictionalism and the Attitudes.Chris John Daly - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (3):423 - 440.
Fiction, Indifference, and Ontology.Matti Eklund - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):557–579.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2012-09-22

Total downloads
138 ( #42,117 of 2,268,045 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #145,157 of 2,268,045 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature