Pragmatics and Cognition 22 (3):430-351 (2014)

Authors
Seungbae Park
Ulsan National Institute Of Science And Technology
Abstract
This paper defends a theory of speech act that I call concurrentism. It consists of the following three theses. 1. We believe, ceteris paribus, that other people’s speech acts concur with their beliefs. 2. Our speech acts, ceteris paribus, concur with our beliefs. 3. When our speech acts deviate from our beliefs, we do not, ceteris paribus, declare the deviations to other people. Concurrentism sheds light on what the hearer believes when he hears an indicative sentence, what the speaker believes when he says an indicative sentence, what the speaker does after he says an indicative sentence contrary to what he believes, why Moore’s paradox occurs, why it is puzzling to say some variants of Moorean sentences, and why it is not absurd to say other variants of Moorean sentences.
Keywords Default Belief  Default Desire  Moorean Sentence  Moore’s Paradox  Speech Act
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Reprint years 2014
DOI 10.1075/pc.22.3.04par
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References found in this work BETA

The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Hutchinson & Co.
Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 17 (2):278-279.
Philosophy of Biology.Elliott Sober - 1993 - Westview Press.
Word and Object.Henry W. Johnstone - 1961 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 22 (1):115-116.

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Citations of this work BETA

Understanding Without Justification and Belief?Seungbae Park - 2017 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 21 (3):379–389.
Philosophers and Scientists Are Social Epistemic Agents.Seungbae Park - 2018 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective.

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