Synthese 53 (2):227-241 (1982)

Derek Parfit
Oxford University
There are two main views about the nature of personal identity. I shall briehy describe these views, say without argument which I believe to be true, and then discuss the implications of this view for one of the main conceptions of rationality. This conception I shall call "C1assical Prudence." I shall argue that, on what I believe to be the true view about personal identity, Classical Prudence is indefensible.
Keywords Metaphysics  Personal Identity  Prudence  Rationality
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DOI 10.1007/BF00484899
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Identity Over Time.Andre Gallois - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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Psychosis and Identity: Alteration or Loss?Tania Gergel & Eduardo Iacoponi - 2017 - Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 23 (5):1029-1037.

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