Biology and Philosophy 34 (4):44 (2019)
AbstractPsychoneural reduction has been debated extensively in the philosophy of neuroscience. In this article I will evaluate metascientific approaches that claim direct molecular and cellular explanations of cognitive functions. I will initially consider the issues involved in linking cellular properties to behaviour from the general perspective of neural circuits. These circuits that integrate the molecular and cellular components underlying cognition and behaviour, making consideration of circuit properties relevant to reductionist debates. I will then apply this general perspective to specific systems where psychoneural reduction has been claimed, namely hippocampal long-term potentiation and the Aplysia gill-withdrawal reflex.
Similar books and articles
Understanding Neural Complexity: A Role for Reduction. [REVIEW]John Bickle - 2001 - Minds and Machines 11 (4):467-481.
The Shape of Things to Come: Psychoneural Reduction and the Future of Psychology. [REVIEW]Joseph U. Neisser - 2005 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (3):259-269.
Beyond the Connectome: How Neuromodulators Shape Neural Circuits.Cornelia I. Bargmann - 2012 - Bioessays 34 (6):458-465.
Psychoneural Reduction of the Genuinely Cognitive: Some Accomplished Facts.John Bickle - 1995 - Philosophical Psychology 8 (3):265-85.
Analog Computationalism and Psychophysical Reduction.Michael King - 1998 - Dissertation, The University of Arizona
Reuse of Molecules and of Neural Circuits.Mark Reimers - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):288-289.
Reduction, Elimination, and Levels: The Case of the LTP-Learning Link.Maurice K. D. Schouten & Huib Looren De Jong - 1999 - Philosophical Psychology 12 (3):237 – 262.
Honderich on Mental Events and Psychoneural Laws.Jaegwon Kim - 1989 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 32 (March):29-48.
Biological Foundations of the Psychoneural Identity Hypothesis.Gordon G. Globus - 1972 - Philosophy of Science 39 (3):291-301.
Sleep, Neural Reuse, and Memory Consolidation Processes.William Fishbein, Hiuyan Lau, Rafael DeJesús & Sara Elizabeth Alger - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):273-273.
Evolution and Ontogeny of Neural Circuits.Sven O. E. Ebbesson - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (3):321-331.
Cognitive Science and Neuroscience: New Wave Reductionism.Robert C. Richardson - 1999 - Philosopical Psychology 12 (3):297-307.
Psychoneural Isomorphism: Historical Background and Current Relevance.Eckart Scheerer - 1994 - Philosophical Psychology 7 (2):183-210.
Has the Last Decade of Challenges to the Multiple Realization Argument Provided Aid and Comfort to Psychoneural Reductionists?John Bickle - 2010 - Synthese 177 (2):247 - 260.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
No citations found.
References found in this work
Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation.James Woodward - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Explaining the Brain: Mechanisms and the Mosaic Unity of Neuroscience.Carl F. Craver - 2007 - Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press.
Thinking About Mechanisms.Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden & Carl F. Craver - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (1):1-25.