Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 84:47 - 82 (1983)
One theory about rationality is the Self-interest Theory, or S. S claims that what each of us has most reason to do is whatever would be best for himself. And it is irrational for anyone to do what he knows would be worse for himself. When morality conflicts with self-interest, many people would reject the Self-interest Theory. But most of these people would accept one of the claims that S makes. This is the claim that we should not care less about our further future, simply because it is further in the future. We should not, for example, postpone pains at the foreseen cost of making them much worse. In our concern for our own self-interest, we should give equal weight to all the parts of our future. In this paper I shall discuss how a Self-interest Theorist should defend this claim.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Similar books and articles
Evidence and Normativity: Reply to Leite.Thomas Kelly - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):465–474.
Does Rationality Presuppose Irrationality.Xavier Vanmechelen - 1998 - Philosophical Explorations 1 (2):126 – 139.
Is There a Nexus Between Reasons and Rationality?Michael Smith - 2007 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 94 (1):279-298.
Rationality in Question: On Eastern and Western Views of Rationality.Shlomo Biderman & Ben-Ami Scharfstein (eds.) - 1989 - E.J. Brill.
A Dilemma for Parfit's Conception of Normativity.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2012 - Analysis 72 (3):466-474.
Popper, Rationality and the Possibility of Social Science.Danny Frederick - 2013 - Theoria 28 (1):61-75.
Added to index2011-05-29
Total downloads49 ( #106,450 of 2,169,095 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #345,850 of 2,169,095 )
How can I increase my downloads?