Journal of the History of Philosophy 32 (2):265-90 (1994)
This paper argues that the behaviorist label yields a caricature of Ryle's position in The Concept of Mind that cannot be adequately fleshed out by reference to the larger corpus of Rylean texts. On the interpretation of Ryle that I offer here, he is best characterized as an "ontological agnostic." Ryle's aim, I believe, is to develop a nondenotational theory of meaning for mental-conduct terms--a theory of meaning which does not presuppose any metaphysical or ontological theory and, hence, does not presuppose behaviorism.
|Keywords||Behaviorism Epistemology Knowledge Mind Ryle, G language meaning|
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Ryle and Collingwood: Their Correspondence and its Philosophical Context.Charlotte Vrijen - 2006 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 14 (1):93 – 131.
Know-How as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account.David Löwenstein - 2017 - Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
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