" To be an object" means" to have properties." Thus, any object has at least one property. A good formalization of this simple conclusion is a thesis of second-order logic:(1) Vx3P (Px) This formalization is based on two assumptions:(a) object variables [Book Review]

In J. Jadacki & J. Pasniczek (eds.), The Lvov-Warsaw School: The New Generation. Reidel. pp. 6--129 (2006)
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