There is no 'truthmaker' argument against nominalism

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (3):325 – 334 (1999)
Josh Parsons
University of Otago
In his two recent books on ontology, Universals: an Opinionated Introduction, and A World of States of Affairs, David Armstrong gives a new argument against nominalism. That argument seems, on the face of it, to be similar to another argument that he used much earlier against Rylean behaviourism: the Truthmaker Argument, stemming from a certain plausible premise, the Truthmaker Principle. Other authors have traced the history of the truthmaker principle, its appearance in the work of Aristotle [10], Bradley [16], and even Husserl [15]. But that is not my task — in this paper I argue that Armstrong’s new argument is not logically analogous to the old, and, in particular, that it is quite possible to be a thoroughgoing nominalist, and hold a truthmaker principle
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DOI 10.1080/00048409912349081
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References found in this work BETA

From a Logical Point of View.W. V. Quine - 1953 - Harvard University Press.
A World of States of Affairs.D. M. Armstrong - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

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Truthmakers.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (2):186–200.
Truthmaker Commitments.Jonathan Schaffer - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 141 (1):7-19.

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