A New Modal Liar

Authors
T. Parent
Virginia Tech
Abstract
Montague's modal liar is thought to show that 'necessarily' cannot be treated as a predicate of sentences. However, if 'necessarily' is treated as an operator on propositions (as is standard), we can also generate paradox (and without Montague's contentious use of the necessitation rule). The reasoning of the new modal liar is not immediately obvious--however, assuming that accessibility is reflexive, one can derive a contradiction from the proposition: This very proposition is not necessary. Thus the key advantage of the operator view is shown to be illusory
Keywords modal logic  possible worlds semantics  paradox  soundness proof  truth
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