Things that are right with the traditional square of opposition

Logica Universalis 2 (1):3-11 (2008)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

.  The truth conditions that Aristotle attributes to the propositions making up the traditional square of opposition have as a consequence that a particular affirmative proposition such as ‘Some A is not B’ is true if there are no Bs. Although a different convention than the modern one, this assumption remained part of centuries of work in logic that was coherent and logically fruitful.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 74,594

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
71 (#167,931)

6 months
1 (#418,924)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Terence Parsons
University of California, Los Angeles

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references