Philosophy of Science 78 (4):579-600 (2011)

Authors
Wendy Parker
Durham University
Abstract
This article identifies conditions under which robust predictive modeling results have special epistemic significance---related to truth, confidence, and security---and considers whether those conditions hold in the context of present-day climate modeling. The findings are disappointing. When today’s climate models agree that an interesting hypothesis about future climate change is true, it cannot be inferred---via the arguments considered here anyway---that the hypothesis is likely to be true or that scientists’ confidence in the hypothesis should be significantly increased or that a claim to have evidence for the hypothesis is now more secure
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DOI 10.1086/661566
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References found in this work BETA

Robustness Analysis.Michael Weisberg - 2006 - Philosophy of Science 73 (5):730-742.
Some Varieties of Robustness.James Woodward - 2006 - Journal of Economic Methodology 13 (2):219-240.
Understanding Pluralism in Climate Modeling.Wendy Parker - 2006 - Foundations of Science 11 (4):349-368.
Robust Evidence and Secure Evidence Claims.Kent W. Staley - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (4):467-488.
II—Wendy S. Parker: Confirmation and Adequacy-for-Purpose in Climate Modelling.Wendy S. Parker - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):233-249.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Diverse Aims of Science.Angela Potochnik - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 53:71-80.
Robustness Analysis as Explanatory Reasoning.Jonah N. Schupbach - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axw008.
Robustness Analysis as Explanatory Reasoning.Jonah N. Schupbach - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (1):275-300.
Robustness and Independent Evidence.Jacob Stegenga & Tarun Menon - 2017 - Philosophy of Science 84 (3):414-435.
Model Robustness as a Confirmatory Virtue: The Case of Climate Science.Elisabeth A. Lloyd - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 49:58-68.

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