Authors
Blay Whitby
University of Sussex
Abstract
In this paper, we take moral agency to be that context in which a particular agent can, appropriately, be held responsible for her actions and their consequences. In order to understand moral agency, we will discuss what it would take for an artifact to be a moral agent. For reasons that will become clear over the course of the paper, we take the artifactual question to be a useful way into discussion but ultimately misleading. We set out a number of conceptual pre-conditions for being a moral agent and then outline how one should — and should not — go about attributing moral agency. In place of a litmus test for such an agency — such as Allen et al.'s Moral Turing Test — we suggest some tools from the conceptual spaces theory and the unified conceptual space theory for mapping out the nature and extent of that agency
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DOI 10.1142/S1793843013500017
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References found in this work BETA

Minds, Brains, and Programs.John R. Searle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.
Consciousness Explained.Daniel C. Dennett - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):905-910.
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Knowing One’s Own Mind.Donald Davidson - 1987 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 60 (3):441-458.

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Citations of this work BETA

Artificial Moral Agents Within an Ethos of AI4SG.Bongani Andy Mabaso - 2020 - Philosophy and Technology 34 (1):7-21.
Computationally Rational Agents Can Be Moral Agents.Bongani Andy Mabaso - 2020 - Ethics and Information Technology 23 (2):137-145.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

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