Intensional logic and brentano’s non-propositional theory of judgment

Grazer Philosophische Studien 29 (1):117-119 (1987)
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The reism adopted by Brentano in the later stages of his philosophy led him to advocate a non-propositional theory of judgment. George Bealer, in his book Quality and Concept, charges that Brentano's theory, and indeed all non-propositional theories of judgment are not adequate to certain "intuitively valid" arguments in the realm of intensional logic. I show that Bealer is mistaken when he claims that Brentano's theory cannot offer an adequate rendering of the first two arguments, and I challenge the intuitive validity of the third. I conclude, therefore, that Bealer's arguments against Brentano do not succeed



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