Journal of Philosophical Research 20:463-480 (1995)
In his book Ethics J. L. Mackie says that moral facts would have to be queer facts. I argue that an act’s hurting somebody is necessarily a reason, though not necessarily a conclusive reason, not to do that act; and that such hurting is a natural fact, not a queer fact. I try to defend this externalist position about this particular reason against internalists such as Mackie, and in particular against the position of Stephen Darwall in Impartial Reason
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