Abstract

In this dissertation I defend the claim that the object of self-deception, in certain central cases, is one or more of the self-deceived's psychological states. In the cases that I am concerned with, I argue, one is accurately diagnosed as self-deceived only if she has a false belief concerning the psychological state that she is experiencing. My account is aimed at explaining those cases ordinarily considered instances of strong self-deception, though I also take advantage of insights from approaches to explaining self-deception that emphasize the weak, or non-intentional, sense of 'deception.' While some cases of self-deception can be explained in terms of motivated biased belief, there remain some troublesome cases in which the self-deceived's behavior seems dissociated enough to suggest the presence of conflicting beliefs. The account I give, however, is non-paradoxical, it does not treat self-deception as isomorphic with interpersonal deception, and it does not appeal to unconscious or partial beliefs. My account is deflationary in respect to strong self-deception, therefore, since I argue that it is not necessary to understand the self-deceived, in these cases, as deceiving herself intentionally. I argue, rather, that self-deception is a special case of being mistaken about one's self. One is self-deceived only if she believes that she is in a psychological state that, in fact, she is not in or disbelieves that she is in a psychological state that she is in. ;The dissertation includes a survey and evaluation of contemporary approaches to the problem. I give an account of self-deception in terms of hierarchical psychological states. I offer an etiology of self-deception, construed as deception about the self, utilizing work from both cognitive and social psychology. The potential compatibility between the theory of self-deception that I am proposing and theories of self-deception put forth by evolutionary psychologists is discussed. I give special consideration to the role that desires and motives may play in the formation of self-deceptive beliefs although my own account does not require them. Finally I put forward considerations regarding the way in which self-deception influences practical reasoning. In sum, I address the questions: What is it? How do we do it? Why do we do it? and How does our doing it affect us as free rational agents?