Inconsistency Theories: The Significance of Semantic Ascent

This is a discussion of different ways of working out the idea that the semantic paradoxes show that natural languages are somehow “inconsistent”. I take the workable form of the idea to be that there are expressions such that a necessary condition of understanding them is that one be inclined to accept inconsistent claims (an conception also suggested by Matti Eklund). I then distinguish “simple” from “complex” forms of such views. On a simple theory, such expressions are meaningless, while on a complex theory they are not. I argue that complex theories are incompatible with truth conditional semantics and that simple theories are only coherent when the inconsistent claims are metalingusitic attributions of meaning. I close with a discussion of the version of the simple metalinguistic theory I have defended in “Understanding the Liar” and other papers.
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DOI 10.1080/00201740701698522
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References found in this work BETA
In Contradiction.Graham Priest - 2006 - Oxford University Press UK.
Inconsistent Languages.Ma'iti Eklund - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2):251-275.
What Vagueness Consists In.Matti Eklund - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 125 (1):27-60.

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Citations of this work BETA
Replacing Truth.Kevin Scharp - 2007 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 50 (6):606 – 621.
Meaning-Constitutivity.Matti Eklund - 2007 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 50 (6):559-574.
On Using Inconsistent Expressions.Arvid Båve - 2012 - Erkenntnis 77 (1):133-148.
Inconsistency and Replacement.Matti Eklund - forthcoming - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-16.
Troubles with Trivialism.Otávio Bueno - 2007 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 50 (6):655 – 667.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

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