Theory and Decision 44 (2):173-198 (1998)

Yun Xu
University of Southern California
We consider the role of preferences in the assessment of an agent's freedom, visualized as the opportunity for choice. After discussing several possible intuitive approaches to the problem, we explore an approach based on the notion of preference orderings that a reasonable person may possibly have. Using different sets of axioms, we characterize the rules for ranking opportunity sets in terms of freedom. We also show that certain axioms for ranking opportunity sets are incompatible.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1023/a:1004924211553
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 58,981
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Republican Freedom, Rights, and the Coalition Problem.Keith Dowding - 2011 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 10 (3):301-322.
Une analyse économique de la liberté de choix.Nicolas Gravel - 2005 - In Alain Leroux & Pierre Livet (eds.), Leçons de Philosophie Économique. Economica. pp. 2.
Does Collective Unfreedom Matter? Individualism, Power and Proletarian Unfreedom.Andreas T. Schmidt - forthcoming - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy:1-22.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

On Preference and Freedom.Prasanta K. Pattanaik & Yongsheng Xu - 1998 - Theory and Decision 44 (2):173-198.
Counterfactual Success and Negative Freedom.Keith Dowding & Martin van Hees - 2007 - Economics and Philosophy 23 (2):141-162.
Collective Preferences, Obligations, and Rational Choice.Margaret Gilbert - 2001 - Economics and Philosophy 17 (1):109-119.
In Defense of Adaptive Preferences.Donald W. Bruckner - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (3):307 - 324.
The Problem of Freedom.Mary T. Clark (ed.) - 1973 - New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Preferences, Conditionals and Freedom.Keith Lehrer - 1980 - In Peter van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause. D. Reidel. pp. 187--201.
Preferences, Welfare, and the Status-Quo Bias.Dale Dorsey - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):535-554.


Added to PP index

Total views
1 ( #1,472,127 of 2,427,505 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #533,878 of 2,427,505 )

How can I increase my downloads?


Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.

My notes