Theory and Decision 44 (2):173-198 (1998)

Abstract
We consider the role of preferences in the assessment of an agent's freedom, visualized as the opportunity for choice. After discussing several possible intuitive approaches to the problem, we explore an approach based on the notion of preference orderings that a reasonable person may possibly have. Using different sets of axioms, we characterize the rules for ranking opportunity sets in terms of freedom. We also show that certain axioms for ranking opportunity sets are incompatible
Keywords Freedom  Opportunity set  Ranking  Reasonable person's preferences
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DOI 10.1023/A:1004924211553
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Why Animals Have an Interest in Freedom.Andreas T. Schmidt - 2015 - Historical Social Research 40 (4):92-109.
Value Neutrality and the Ranking of Opportunity Sets.Michael Garnett - 2016 - Economics and Philosophy 32 (1):99-119.
Republican Freedom, Rights, and the Coalition Problem.Keith Dowding - 2011 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 10 (3):301-322.

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