Erkenntnis 82 (3):451-472 (2017)

Authors
Cedric Paternotte
Université Paris-Sorbonne
Abstract
Ordinary common knowledge is formally expressed by strong probabilistic common belief. How strong exactly? The question can be answered by drawing from the similar equivalence, recently explored, between plain and probabilistic individual beliefs. I argue that such a move entails that common knowledge displays a double fragility: as a description of a collective state and as a phenomenon, because it can respectively disappear as group size increases, or more worryingly as the epistemic context changes. I argue that despite this latter fragility, the effects of common knowledge on action are robust. Unfortunately, this in turn leads to a third fragility, that of the concept of common knowledge, which threatens to collapse on probabilistic common belief. This also reveals a disanalogy between the individual and the collective cases. I finally pinpoint the subtle difference entailed by the two concepts, expressed in terms of the attitude towards contrary evidence or of the agents’ awareness. As a result, common knowledge can be defended as a concept, which refers to a fragile yet distinct collective attitude.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s10670-016-9828-4
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 55,873
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Shared Intentionality and Automatic Imitation: The Case of La Ola.Piotr Tomasz Makowski - 2020 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 50 (5):465-492.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Epistemic Core of Weak Joint Action.Cedric Paternotte - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology (1):1-24.
What Is Common Knowledge?Zachary Ernst - 2011 - Episteme 8 (3):209-226.
Varieties of Interpersonal Compatibility of Beliefs.Giacomo Bonanno - 1999 - In Jelle Gerbrandy, Maarten Marx, Maarten de Rijke & Yde Venema (eds.), Essays dedicated to Johan van Benthem on the occasion of his 50th birthday. Amsterdam University Press.
Common Knowledge and the Theory of Interaction.Ann Elizabeth Cudd - 1988 - Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
Common Knowledge and Limit Knowledge.Christian W. Bach & Jérémie Cabessa - 2012 - Theory and Decision 73 (3):423-440.
Three Kinds of Collective Attitudes.Christian List - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S9):1601-1622.
Consensus By Identifying Extremists.Robin D. Hanson - 1998 - Theory and Decision 44 (3):293-301.
About Cut Elimination for Logics of Common Knowledge.Luca Alberucci & Gerhard Jäger - 2005 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 133 (1):73-99.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2016-07-03

Total views
35 ( #289,722 of 2,401,777 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #551,897 of 2,401,777 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes