The Logical Structure of Russell's Negative Facts

Abstract

This article uncovers the logical structure of Russell’s negative facts, which he postulated in his 1919 lectures on logical atomism as a way of accounting for the truth of negative propositions. It is argued that he subsequently abandoned his belief in the existence of negative facts because the latter could not be reconciled with his Principle of Acquaintance, a fundamental corner stone of his logical atomism. A proposed fine tuning of this Principle shows that the postulation of negative facts represents the best solution to the problem of negation which his logical atomism must face

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Index to Russell, N.S.16-20.Sheila Turcon - 2000 - Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies 20 (2).

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