Synthese 137 (3):421 - 444 (2003)
It is often thought that instances of the T-schema such as snow is white is true if and only if snow is white state correspondences between sentences andthe world, and that therefore such sentences play a crucial role in correspondence theories oftruth. I argue that this assumption trivializes the correspondence theory: even a disquotationaltheory of truth would be a correspondence theory on this conception. This discussionallows one to get clearer about what a correspondence theory does claim, and toward the end of thepaper I discuss what a true correspondence theory of truth would involve.
|Keywords||Philosophy Philosophy Epistemology Logic Metaphysics Philosophy of Language|
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Citations of this work BETA
Tarski on the Necessity Reading of Convention T.Douglas Eden Patterson - 2006 - Synthese 151 (1):1-32.
What Should a Correspondence Theory Be and Do?Patricia Marino - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (3):415-457.
Toward a Modest Correspondence Theory of Truth: Predicates and Properties.Patricia Marino - 2008 - Dialogue 47 (01):81-.
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