Wittgenstein on understanding and interpretation (comments on the work of Thomas morawetz)

Philosophical Investigations 29 (2):129–139 (2006)
Wittgenstein's distinction between understanding and interpretation is fundamental to the account of meaning in _Philosophical Investigations. In his discussion of rule-following, Wittgenstein explicitly rejects the idea that understanding or grasping a rule is a matter of interpretation. Wittgenstein explains meaning and rule-following in terms of action, rejecting both realist and Cartesian accounts of the mental. I argue that in his effort to employ Wittgenstein's views on meaning and rule-following, Professor Morawetz embraces the position Wittgenstein rejects. In the course of making his case for law as a "deliberative practice", Professor Morawetz embraces interpretation as a fundamental element of human practices, thereby taking up precisely the view Wittgenstein rejects
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9205.2006.00283.x
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 34,998
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total downloads
26 ( #235,845 of 2,273,613 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #375,354 of 2,273,613 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature