Philosophical Studies 138 (3):335 - 347 (2008)
I develop a problem for the Fregean Reference Shift analysis of that-clause reference. The problem is discussed by Stephen Schiffer in his recent book The Things We Mean (2003). Either the defender of the Fregean Reference Shift analysis must count certain counterintuitive inferences as valid, or else he must reject a plausible Exportation rule. I consider several responses. I find that the best response relies on a Kaplan-inspired analysis of quantified belief reports. But I argue that this response faces some serious problems.
|Keywords||Frege Belief reports Quantification|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Intensional Logic and the Metaphysics of Intentionality.Edward N. Zalta - 1988 - MIT Press.
Thought Without Representation.John Perry - 1986 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 60 (1):137-151.
Citations of this work BETA
Similar books and articles
Two-Dimensionalism: A Neo-Fregean Interpretation.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2006 - In Manuel García-Carpintero & Josep Macià (eds.), Two-Dimensional Semantics. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Reflections on Reference and Reflexivity.Kent Bach - 2007 - In Michael O'Rourke Corey Washington (ed.), Situating Semantics: Essays on the Philosophy of John Perry. pp. 395--424.
The Natural Kind Analysis of Ceteris Paribus Law Statements.Barry Ward - 2007 - Philosophical Topics 35 (1/2):359-380.
Direct Reference in Thought and Speech.Kirk A. Ludwig - 1993 - Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 26 (1):49-76.
On a Fregean Argument for the Distinctness of Sense and Reference.R. M. Sainsbury - 1983 - Analysis 43 (1):12 - 14.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads62 ( #84,503 of 2,169,095 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #345,850 of 2,169,095 )
How can I increase my downloads?