Consciousness meets Lewisian interpretation theory: A multistage account of intentionality

In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind, Vol. 1 (2021)
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Abstract

In “Radical Interpretation” (1974), David Lewis asked: by what constraints, and to what extent, do the non-intentional, physical facts about Karl determine the intentional facts about him? There are two popular approaches: the reductive externalist program and the phenomenal intentionality program. I argue against both approaches. Then I sketch an alternative multistage account incorporating ideas from both camps. If we start with Karl's conscious experiences, we can appeal to Lewisian ideas to explain his other intentional states. This account develops the multistage Lewisian approach presented at the end of my earlier "Does Phenomenology Ground Mental Content?" (2013).

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Adam Pautz
Brown University

Citations of this work

Inferentialism, Australian style.David J. Chalmers - 2021 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 92.
Functionalism.Janet Levin - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Consciousness and Intentionality.Charles Siewert - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Representation and Rationality.Ray Buchanan & Sinan Dogramaci - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (1):221-230.
Beliefs as Self-Verifying Fictions.Angela Mendelovici - forthcoming - In Eric Schwitzgebel & Jonathan Jong (eds.), What is Belief? Oxford University Press.

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References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
Philosophical Investigations.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1953 - New York, NY, USA: Wiley-Blackwell. Edited by G. E. M. Anscombe.
The character of consciousness.David John Chalmers - 2010 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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