Theory and Decision 75 (4):581-597 (2013)

Marc Pauly
University of Groningen
The paper works with a formal model of referenda, where a finite number of voters can choose between two options and abstention. A referendum will be invalid if too many voters abstain, otherwise the referendum will return one of the two options. We consider quorum rules where an option is chosen if it is preferred by the majority of voters and if at least a certain number of voters (the quorum) votes for the alternative. The paper characterizes these rules as the only referenda which are strategy-proof over certain preferences
Keywords Social choice theory  Referendum  Voting rules  Strategy-proofness
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11238-013-9358-3
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 70,091
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Reasoning About Social Choice Functions.Nicolas Troquard, Wiebe Hoek & Michael Wooldridge - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (4):473-498.
A.V. Dicey: The Referendum as the People's Veto.Mads H. Qvortrup - 1999 - History of Political Thought 20 (3):531-546.
Unanimity and Resource Monotonicity.Biung-Ghi Ju - 2005 - Theory and Decision 59 (1):1-17.


Added to PP index

Total views
31 ( #368,463 of 2,506,341 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
5 ( #140,084 of 2,506,341 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes