Do theories of consciousness rest on a mistake?

Philosophical Issues 20 (1):333-367 (2010)
Authors
Adam Pautz
Brown University
Abstract
Using empirical research on pain, sound and taste, I argue against the combination of intentionalism about consciousness and a broadly ‘tracking’ psychosemantics of the kind defended by Fodor, Dretske, Hill, Neander, Stalnaker, Tye and others. Then I develop problems with Kriegel and Prinz's attempt to combine a Dretskean psychosemantics with the view that sensible properties are Shoemakerian response-dependent properties. Finally, I develop in detail my own 'primitivist' view of sensory intentionality.
Keywords consciousness  pain  phenomenal intentionality
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DOI 10.1111/j.1533-6077.2010.00189.x
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References found in this work BETA

Intentionality.John Searle - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
Physical Realization.Sydney Shoemaker - 2007 - Oxford University Press UK.
Putnam's Paradox.David Lewis - 1984 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (3):221 – 236.
Thinking About Consciousness.David Papineau - 2002 - Oxford University Press UK.

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