Fictional coreference as a problem for the pretense theory

Philosophical Studies 141 (2):147 - 156 (2008)
Abstract
There seems to be a perfectly ordinary sense in which different speakers can use an empty name to talk about the same thing. Call this fictional coreference. It is a constraint on an adequate theory of empty names that it provide a satisfactory account of fictional coreference. The main claim of this paper is that the pretense theory of empty names does not respect this constraint.
Keywords Empty names  Fictional coreference  Pretense
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-007-9156-2
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References found in this work BETA
Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
Naming and Necessity.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Harvard University Press.
The Things We Mean.Stephen R. Schiffer - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 2010 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 431-433.

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Citations of this work BETA
A Note on Pretense and Co-Reference.Michael Hicks - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (3):395 - 400.
Pretense and Fiction-Directed Thought.Michael R. Hicks - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (6):1549-1573.

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