Authors
L. A. Paul
Yale University
Abstract
I argue that we can understand the de se by employing the subjective mode of presentation or, if one’s ontology permits it, by defending an abundant ontology of perspectival personal properties or facts. I do this in the context of a discussion of Cappelen and Dever’s recent criticisms of the de se. Then, I discuss the distinctive role of the first personal perspective in discussions about empathy, rational deference, and self-understanding, and develop a way to frame the problem of lacking prospective access to your future self as a problem with your capacity to imaginatively empathize with your future selves.
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DOI 10.1080/0020174X.2017.1261991
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References found in this work BETA

Epiphenomenal Qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
Transformative Experience.L. A. Paul - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
Self-Projection and the Brain.Randy L. Buckner & Daniel C. Carroll - 2007 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):49-57.
Know How.Jason Stanley - 2011 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

First-Person Thought.Daniel Morgan & Léa Salje - 2020 - Analysis 80 (1):148-163.
De Se Preferences and Empathy for Future Selves1.L. A. Paul - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):7-39.
Problems with Late Preemption.L. A. Paul - 1998 - Analysis 58 (1):48–53.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

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