In Blockheads! (2019)

Authors
Adam Pautz
Brown University
Abstract
In this chapter, Pautz raises a puzzle about spatial experience for phenomenal internalists like Ned Block. If an accidental, lifelong brain-in-the-void (BIV) should have all the same experiences as you, it would have an experience as of items having various shapes, and be able to acquire concepts of those shapes, despite being cut off from real things with the shapes. Internalists cannot explain this by saying that BIV is presented with Peacocke-style visual field regions having various shapes, because these would have to be non-physical sense data. They might instead explain this by saying that BIV “phenomenally represents” various shape properties. But since BIV lacks any interesting physical relations to shapes, this would imply that phenomenally representation is an irreducible relation.
Keywords consciousness  mental representation
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Upload history
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Constructing the World.David Chalmers - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
Origins of Objectivity.Tyler Burge - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
Writing the Book of the World.Theodore Sider - 2011 - Oxford University Press.

View all 53 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Qualitative Character of Spatial Perception.Douglas B. Meehan - 2007 - Dissertation, Graduate Center, City University of New York
Spatial Experience and Special Relativity.Brian Cutter - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (9):2297-2313.
An Argument for Shape Internalism.Jan Almäng - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (4):819-836.
Acting on (Bodily) Experience.Adrian J. T. Smith - 2009 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 15 (1):82 - 99.
Egocentric Spatial Representation in Action and Perception.Robert Briscoe - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2):423-460.
Shape Properties and Perception.Kirk Ludwig - 1996 - Philosophical Issues 7:325-350.
A Puzzle About Seeing for Representationalism.James Openshaw & Assaf Weksler - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2625-2646.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2020-01-21

Total views
76 ( #121,948 of 2,333,952 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
49 ( #11,731 of 2,333,952 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes