Intentionalism and perceptual presence

Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):495-541 (2007)
Abstract
H. H. Price (1932) held that experience is essentially presentational. According to Price, when one has an experience of a tomato, nothing can be more certain than that there is something of which one is aware. Price claimed that the same applies to hallucination. In general, whenever one has a visual experience, there is something of which one is aware, according to Price. Call this thesis Item-Awareness
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DOI 10.1111/j.1520-8583.2007.00134.x
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