II—L. A. Paul: Categorical Priority and Categorical Collapse


Authors
Abstract
I explore some of the ways that assumptions about the nature of substance shape metaphysical debates about the structure of Reality. Assumptions about the priority of substance play a role in an argument for monism, are embedded in certain pluralist metaphysical treatments of laws of nature, and are central to discussions of substantivalism and relationalism. I will then argue that we should reject such assumptions and collapse the categorical distinction between substance and property.
Keywords priority  substance  property  monism  pluralism  Ground  fundamentality  reality  ontology
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/supa.2013.87.issue-1
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 47,182
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

What is Structural Realism?James Ladyman - 1998 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 29 (3):409-424.
Monism: The Priority of the Whole.Jonathan Schaffer - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (1):31-76.
The Structure of Objects.Kathrin Koslicki - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
A World of States of Affairs.D. M. Armstrong - 1993 - Philosophical Perspectives 7 (3):429-440.

View all 46 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

What Not to Multiply Without Necessity.Jonathan Schaffer - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (4):644-664.
Laws of Nature, Explanation, and Semantic Circularity.Erica Shumener - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (3):787-815.
Categories.Javier Cumpa - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (1).
Between Factualism and Substantialism: Structuralism as a Third Way.Steven French - 2018 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 26 (5):701-721.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2013-06-09

Total views
166 ( #49,510 of 2,289,512 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
16 ( #49,748 of 2,289,512 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature