Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1):89-113 (2013)
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Abstract |
I explore some of the ways that assumptions about the nature of substance shape metaphysical debates about the structure of Reality. Assumptions about the priority of substance play a role in an argument for monism, are embedded in certain pluralist metaphysical treatments of laws of nature, and are central to discussions of substantivalism and relationalism. I will then argue that we should reject such assumptions and collapse the categorical distinction between substance and property.
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Keywords | priority substance property monism pluralism Ground fundamentality reality ontology |
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DOI | 10.1111/supa.2013.87.issue-1 |
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References found in this work BETA
The Four-Category Ontology: A Metaphysical Foundation for Natural Science.E. J. Lowe - 2005 - Clarendon Press.
What is Structural Realism?James Ladyman - 1998 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 29 (3):409-424.
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Citations of this work BETA
What Not to Multiply Without Necessity.Jonathan Schaffer - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (4):644-664.
Laws of Nature, Explanation, and Semantic Circularity.Erica Shumener - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (3):787-815.
Between Factualism and Substantialism: Structuralism as a Third Way.Steven French - 2018 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 26 (5):701-721.
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