Logical Constraints on Judgement Aggregation

Journal of Philosophical Logic 35 (6):569 - 585 (2006)

Martin Van Hees
VU University Amsterdam
Marc Pauly
University of Groningen
Logical puzzles like the doctrinal paradox raise the problem of how to aggregate individual judgements into a collective judgement, or alternatively, how to merge collectively inconsistent knowledge bases. In this paper, we view judgement aggregation as a function on propositional logic valuations, and we investigate how logic constrains judgement aggregation. In particular, we show that there is no non-dictatorial decision method for aggregating sets of judgements in a logically consistent way if the decision method is local, i.e., only depends on the individual judgements on the proposition under consideration
Keywords Philosophy
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DOI 10.1007/s10992-005-9011-x
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Introduction to a General Theory of Elementary Propositions.Emil Post - 1921 - American Journal of Mathematics 43 (1):163--185.

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What Is Justified Group Belief?Jennifer Lackey - 2016 - Philosophical Review Recent Issues 125 (3):341-396.
Arrow's Theorem in Judgment Aggregation.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2007 - Social Choice and Welfare 29 (1):19-33.

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