Logical Constraints on Judgement Aggregation

Journal of Philosophical Logic 35 (6):569 - 585 (2006)
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Logical puzzles like the doctrinal paradox raise the problem of how to aggregate individual judgements into a collective judgement, or alternatively, how to merge collectively inconsistent knowledge bases. In this paper, we view judgement aggregation as a function on propositional logic valuations, and we investigate how logic constrains judgement aggregation. In particular, we show that there is no non-dictatorial decision method for aggregating sets of judgements in a logically consistent way if the decision method is local, i.e., only depends on the individual judgements on the proposition under consideration



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Author Profiles

Marc Pauly
University of Groningen
Martin Van Hees
VU University Amsterdam

Citations of this work

What Is Justified Group Belief.Jennifer Lackey - 2016 - Philosophical Review Recent Issues 125 (3):341-396.
Probabilistic Opinion Pooling.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2016 - In Alan Hájek & Christopher Hitchcock (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Probability and Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Arrow's theorem in judgment aggregation.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2007 - Social Choice and Welfare 29 (1):19-33.

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References found in this work

Logical Constraints on Judgement Aggregation.Marc Pauly & Martin Hees - 2006 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 35 (6):569-585.
Introduction to a general theory of elementary propositions.Emil L. Post - 1921 - American Journal of Mathematics 43 (3):163--185.

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