Logical Constraints on Judgement Aggregation

Journal of Philosophical Logic 35 (6):569 - 585 (2006)

Authors
Martin Van Hees
VU University Amsterdam
Marc Pauly
University of Groningen
Abstract
Logical puzzles like the doctrinal paradox raise the problem of how to aggregate individual judgements into a collective judgement, or alternatively, how to merge collectively inconsistent knowledge bases. In this paper, we view judgement aggregation as a function on propositional logic valuations, and we investigate how logic constrains judgement aggregation. In particular, we show that there is no non-dictatorial decision method for aggregating sets of judgements in a logically consistent way if the decision method is local, i.e., only depends on the individual judgements on the proposition under consideration
Keywords Philosophy
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DOI 10.1007/s10992-005-9011-x
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Introduction to a General Theory of Elementary Propositions.Emil Post - 1921 - American Journal of Mathematics 43 (1):163--185.

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What Is Justified Group Belief?Jennifer Lackey - 2016 - Philosophical Review Recent Issues 125 (3):341-396.
Arrow's Theorem in Judgment Aggregation.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2007 - Social Choice and Welfare 29 (1):19-33.

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