Sensory awareness is not a wide physical relation: An empirical argument against externalist intentionalism

Noûs 40 (2):205-240 (2006)

Adam Pautz
Brown University
Abstract This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)
Keywords Disjunctivism  Epistemology  Externalism  Intentionalism  Internalism  Sensation
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DOI 10.1111/j.0029-4624.2006.00607.x
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References found in this work BETA

Consciousness, Color, and Content.Michael Tye - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 113 (3):233-235.
Perception and the Fall From Eden.David J. Chalmers - 2006 - In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. pp. 49--125.

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Citations of this work BETA

Qualia Ain't in the Head.Alex Byrne & Michael Tye - 2006 - Noûs 40 (2):241-255.
Senses for Senses.Brad Thompson - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):99 – 117.

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