Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5-6):1-23 (2015)

Authors
Sarah Paul
New York University, Abu Dhabi
Abstract
Is there a sense in which we exercise direct volitional control over our beliefs? Most agree that there is not, but discussions tend to focus on control in forming a belief. The focus here is on sustaining a belief over time in the face of ‘epistemic temptation’ to abandon it. It is argued that we do have a capacity for ‘doxastic self-control’ over time that is partly volitional in nature, and that its exercise is rationally permissible
Keywords Belief  Volition  Temptation  Self-control  Diachronic rationality
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DOI 10.1080/00455091.2015.1122875
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy.Bernard Williams - 1985 - Harvard University Press.
The Possibility of Altruism.Thomas Nagel - 1970 - Oxford Clarendon Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.

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Citations of this work BETA

Self-Control in Action and Belief.Martina Orlandi & Sarah Stroud - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 24 (2):225-242.

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