In Perception (forthcoming)

Authors
Adam Pautz
Brown University
Abstract
This is a chapter from my forthcoming book Perception (Routledge). I explain the physical state view of sensory experience (Papineau, McLaughlin, others). I criticize an argument against it based on the "transparency observation". Then I develop two alternative arguments against it. The first is a Leibniz's Law argument based on the essentially externally directed character of some experiences. The second concerns "brains in vats". Finally I consider a recent response due to David Papineau, which involves rejecting essential external directedness.
Keywords perception  consciousness  physicalism  Papineau  identity theory  representation
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy the book Find it on Amazon.com
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Acquaintance.Matt Duncan - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (3):e12727.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Papineau on Phenomenal Concepts. [REVIEW]Tim Crane - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):155-162.
Some Thoughts About Thinking About Consciousness.Diana Raffman - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):163-170.
Papineau on the Actualist HOT Theory of Consciousness.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):581-586.
A Sensorimotor Account of Vision and Visual Consciousness.J. Kevin O’Regan & Alva Noë - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):883-917.
Papineau’s Physicalism.Helen Steward - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (3):667-672.
Is Consciousness Science Fundamentally Flawed?John Taylor - 2013 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (3-4):3-4.
Representationalism About Consciousness.Adam Pautz - forthcoming - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2020-07-07

Total views
122 ( #87,444 of 2,448,724 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
39 ( #17,510 of 2,448,724 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes