Updating as Communication

Abstract
Traditional procedures for rational updating fail when it comes to self-locating opinions, such as your credences about where you are and what time it is. This paper develops an updating procedure for rational agents with self-locating beliefs. In short, I argue that rational updating can be factored into two steps. The first step uses information you recall from your previous self to form a hypothetical credence distribution, and the second step changes this hypothetical distribution to reflect information you have genuinely learned as time has passed. While the second step resembles traditional procedures of updating by conditionalization, the first is best understood by analogy to traditional models of how agents transmit self-locating opinions through ordinary interpersonal communication.
Keywords Sleeping Beauty  updating  self-locating  Frege's Puzzle
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DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00572.x
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References found in this work BETA
Themes From Kaplan.Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.) - 1989 - Oxford University Press, Usa.
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays.W. V. Quine - 1969 - Columbia University Press.
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Epistemic Modals, Relativism and Assertion.Andy Egan - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (1):1--22.

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Citations of this work BETA
Agreement and Communication.Max Kölbel - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S1):101-120.
Centered Communication.Clas Weber - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (S1):205-223.
Relativism 2: Semantic Content.Max Kölbel - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (1):52–67.

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