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What are the Contents of Experiences?
In Fiona Macpherson, The Admissible Contents of Experience. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 114–138 (2011)
Abstract
I address three interrelated issues concerning the contents of experiences. First, I address the preliminary issue of what it means to say that experiences have contents. Then I address the issue of why we should believe that experiences have contents. Finally, I address the issue of what the contents of experiences are.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Emotional Justification.Santiago Echeverri - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (3):541-566.
Mind-Dependence in Berkeley and the Problem of Perception.Umrao Sethi - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (4):648-668.
Object Files, Properties, and Perceptual Content.Santiago Echeverri - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (2):283-307.
Illusions of Optimal Motion, Relationism, and Perceptual Content.Santiago Echeverri - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):146-173.
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