Pavel Baryshnikov
Pyatigorsk State University
This article focuses on the methodological basis for the criticism of the computationalism and “computer metaphor” in the philosophy of cognitive sciences. We suppose that the computational paradigm is the direct consequence of the theoretical confusion of phenomenal and cognitive kinds of experience. Cognitive processes, considered as the forms of computational description, are available for computer modelling. That implies the strong position of the computer metaphor in the neuroscience. In our opinion the key problem is the vague ontological nature of the symbols which form the computational operations in the cognitive procedures. Despite the successful development of neuroscience, it is still impossible to explain the meaning of the content of mental states. The article provides the detailed analysis of the critical approaches to the computational models of consciousness. The special attention is given to the comparison of data integration in the artificial intellectual systems with semantic aspects of the phenomenal consciousness. In the first case the foundations of output are the hierarchy of classes, the rules protocols and applying heuristics and strategies. In the second case the knowledge is formed by qualia, metaphorical conceptualization and pragmatic level of communication. Natural principles of knowledge forming are unachievable for machine intellectual procedures.
Keywords computationalism  phenomenal consciousness  computability  data integration  mental states.
Categories (categorize this paper)
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 63,340
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Семантические процессы сознания.П.Н Барышников - 2014 - Epistemology and Philosophy of Science 41 (3):96-114.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Neurophilosophy of Consciousness.Pete Mandik - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. pp. 418--430.
Phenomenal Consciousness.Dmitry Ivanov - 2009 - Analytica 3:19-36.
Computationalism and the Locality Principle.David Longinotti - 2009 - Minds and Machines 19 (4):495-506.
Theories of Consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (1):58-64.
Phenomenal Consciousness Lite: No Thanks!J. Kevin O'Regan & Erik Myin - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):520-521.
How Many Kinds of Consciousness?David M. Rosenthal - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4):653-665.
Consciousness, Folk Psychology, and Cognitive Science.Alvin I. Goldman - 1993 - Consciousness and Cognition 2 (4):364-382.
Phenomenal Consciousness and Intentionality.Dana K. Nelkin - 2001 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 7.
Conceptualizing Physical Consciousness.James Tartaglia - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (6):817-838.
Could Phenomenal Consciousness Function as a Cognitive Unconscious?Max Velmans - 2002 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (3):357-358.
Conciencia fenoménica y acceso cognitivo.Nora Stigol - 1998 - Análisis Filosófico 18 (2):131-142.


Added to PP index

Total views
52 ( #204,716 of 2,448,757 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #224,186 of 2,448,757 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes