Our knowledge of the law: objectivity and practice in legal theory

Portland, Or.: Hart (2007)
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Abstract

In this book the author argues that knowledge is the outcome of an activity of judging, which is constrained by reasons (reflexive).

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George Pavlakos
University of Glasgow

Citations of this work

Human Dignity as a Form of Life: Notes on Its Foundations and Meaning in Institutional Morality.Saulo Monteiro Martinho de Matos - 2020 - International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue Internationale de Sémiotique Juridique 33 (1):47-63.
Knowledge Construction in Legal Reasoning: A Three Stage Model of Law’s Evolution in Practical Discourse.Olaf Tans - 2018 - International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue Internationale de Sémiotique Juridique 31 (1):1-19.

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