Semantics with Only One Bedeutung

Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 13:81-85 (2008)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The modification of Frege's semantics that consists in using only one reference (Bedeutung, denotate) truth instead of two references truth and falsity is proposed. According to Frege 1) every true sentence stands for truth, 2) every false sentence stands for falsity. We modify the second statement: 2*) every false sentence doesn't stand for truth. The modification of sentential logic interpretation will consist in change of semantic rules: a) every formula A stands either for truth or falsity, b.1) the formula A has value T iff the formula A stands for truth, b.2) the formula A has value F iff the formula A stands for falsity. Let’s change rules a) and b.2) on: a*) every formula A either stands or doesn't stand for truth, b.2*) the formula A has value F iff the formula A doesn't stand for truth. So, we have only one reference but still two values. The proposed approach can be extended to non-classical cases, for which the bivalence principle doesn't take place. An ordered pair of the sentences A, ~A is put in correspondence to the sentence A. Each sentence of ordered pair can either stands or doesn't stand for truthindependently from the other. Thus for each pair of sentences we have four possible variants of reference which are generate four functional values.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,386

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

This is Nonsense.Gregor Damschen - 2008 - The Reasoner 2 (10):6-8.
Truthmaker Gaps and the No-No Paradox.Patrick Greenough - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):547 - 563.
Coreference.Reinhard Muskens - 1993 - In R. E. Asher & J. M. Y. Simpson (eds.), The Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics. Oxford: Pergamon. pp. 769.
Revenge of the liar: new essays on the paradox.J. C. Beall (ed.) - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Accepting inconsistencies from the paradoxes.Bradley H. Dowden - 1984 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 13 (2):125-30.
Communication by Ramsey-sentence clause.Herbert G. Bohnert - 1967 - Philosophy of Science 34 (4):341-347.
Truth-Conditional Pragmatics.Anne Bezuidenhout - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:105-134.
Did Frege really consider truth as an object?Dirk Greimann - 2007 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 75 (1):125-148.
Existence predicate.Reinhard Muskens - 1993 - In R. E. Asher & J. M. Y. Simpson (eds.), The Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics. Oxford: Pergamon. pp. 1191.

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-04-04

Downloads
26 (#596,950)

6 months
7 (#418,426)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references