Kluwer Academic Publishers (2003)

Authors
Pawel Kawalec
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski (KUL)
Abstract
This book revives inductive logic by bringing out the underlying epistemology. The resulting structural reliabilist theory propounds the view that justification supervenes on syntactic and semantic properties of sentences as justification-bearers. It is claimed to set up a genuine alternative to the prevailing theories of justification. Kawalec substantiates this claim by confronting structural reliabilism with a number of epistemological problems. While the book is addressed to both professionals and students of philosophical logic, probability, epistemology, and philosophy of science, it also surveys ideas central to the development of philosophy in the 20th century. It will be a valuable companion to multifarious graduate and postgraduate courses.
Keywords reliabilism  Carnap's structuralism  inductive logic  epistemological bayesianism
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